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[39 C.2d 529; 247 P.2d 707] 
[S. F. No. 18591. In Bank. Aug. 28, 1952.] 
FIREMAN'S FUND INDEMNITY COMPANY, Petitioner, 
v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION and 
ETHEL ELLIO'l'T, Respondents. 
[1] Workmen's Compensation- Compensable Injuries- Relation 
to Employment.-Liberal though the application of the com-
pensation act has been to encompass injuries which may rea-
sonably be regarded as having some causal relation with the 
employment, each case must be decided in the light of its 
own particular facts. 
[2] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Injuries Sustained Off Employer's 
Premises.-Where contract of employment contemplates ren-
dition of services on employer's premises, injuries suffered 
elsewhere are not compensable unless some special connec-
tion with the employment can be shown. 
[3] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Acts Personal to Employee.-Rule 
that compensation law covers personal acts necessary to the 
comfort, convenience and welfare of the employee is based 
on the premise that, at the time of injury, he was at work 
and either on the employer's premises or on a business er-
rand off the premises. 
[4] Id.-Compensa.ble Injuries-Injuries Received Outside Regu-
lar Working Hours.--A cook and housekeeper is not entitled 
to compensation for injuries sustained by her when she slipped 
and fell in stepping off the paved portion of a road onto 
the graveled shoulder, where she was neither at work nor 
on her employer's premises when injured, and where she was 
then taking a recreational walk with a friend after she had 
completed her household duties for her employer. 
[5] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Injuries Received Outside Regu-
lar Working Hours.-Mere fact that employer sanctioned 
employee's departure on a proposed walk does not make 
such walk an act "authorized" by the contract of employ-
ment so that an injury incurred during the walk would be 
compensable, where the employee had completed her house-
hold duties for her employer and the injury took place off 
the employer's premises. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 84; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation, § 215. 
[3] See Cal.Jur., Workmen's Compensation, § 74; Am.Jur., 
Workmen's Compensation. § 236. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 71; 
[2] Workmen's Compensation, § 98; [3] Workmen's Compensa-
tion, § 89; [ 4-6} Workmen's Compensation, § 97.1. 
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[6] !d.-Compensable Injuries-Injuries Received Outside Regu-
lar Working Hours.-Mere fact that recreational walk taken 
by employee at time of injury was recommended by her 
medical adviser and she was thereby conditioning herself 
to perform better the duties of her employment· does not 
establish the necessary causal connection with the employ-
ment so as to make compensable the injury sustained during 
such walk, where the walk was being taken off her employ-
er's premises after she had completed her household duties 
for the employer, and was not only optional with her but 
was exclusively for her own recreation and indulgence. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Ac-
cident Commission awarding compensation for personal in-
juries. Award annulled. 
Leonard, Hanna & Brophy and Edmund D. Leonard for 
Petitioner. 
Edmund J. Thomas, Jr., Robert Ball and Leonard Levy 
for Respondents. 
SPENCE, J.-Petitioner seeks the annulment of an award 
of the respondent commission in favor of Ethel Elliott, who 
was injured while taking a walk after she had completed 
her household duties for her employer. This case presents 
a problem similar to that involved in Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. 
v. Industrial Ace. Corn., S. F. No. 18590, ante, p. 512 [247 
P.2d 697], this day filed: the extent to which injuries sus-
tained in the pursuit of recreational activities may be re-
garded as arising out of and occurring in the course of the 
employment. (Lab. Code, § 3600, subds. (b), (c).) A re-
view of the instant record, in the light of the legal prin-
ciples discussed in the companion case, compels the conclu-
sion that the injury here must likewise be held noncom-
pensable. 
The facts are undisputed. Mrs. Elliott was employed as 
a cook and housekeeper in the Orinda home of Mrs. Georgie 
S. Hubbard. She worked eight hours per day, but after 
completing her daily duties, she remained on the premises, 
eating and sleeping there, except on her days off. It was 
her custom to take short walks once or twice a day during 
her free time, for recreation. She had been advised to do 
so by the doctor .attending her employer, Mrs. Hubbard. 
Mrs. Elliott sustained the injuries in question on the eve-
ning of July 10, 1950. Mrs. Hubbard was ill during the 
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day and Mrs. Elliott was required to remain in attendance 
upon her, so that she missed her customary midday walk. 
In the evening a friend of Mrs. Elliott came to the house 
before Mrs. Elliott had finished her work and waited for 
her so that they might take a walk together. Mrs. Elliott 
testified that her last task for the day was the depositing 
of some garbage in the refuse can near the driveway. She 
had told Mrs. Hubbard that she intended to take a short 
walk, and the latter replied, "Don't go far. You can go, 
but don't go far.'' Mrs. Elliott then joined her friend, and 
they started down the public road fronting her employer's 
property. The traveled portion of the road was paved and 
along each side was a graveled area, but there was no curb-
ing or sidewalks. When they had proceeded along the road 
some 50 feet from the Hubbard driveway, they were con-
fronted by the headlights of an approaching automobile. 
Mrs. Elliott stepped off the paved portion of the road onto 
the graveled shoulder, slipped and fell, breaking her leg. 
Upon these facts the commission found that Mrs. Elliott 
''sustained injury arising out of and occuring in the course 
of her employment'' and made its award accordingly. Peti-
tioner contends that the record does not bring the injury 
within the coverage of the compensation act in that it oc-
curred off the employer's premises while the employee was 
engaged during her mrn free time in a recreational activity 
entirely unassociated with the employment. [1] Liberal 
though the application of the compensation act has been in 
this state to encompass injuries which may reasonably be 
regarded as having some causal relation with the employ-
ment (Industrial Ind. Exchange v. Industria}, Ace. Com., 26 
Cal.2d. 130, 137 [156 P.2d 926] ; Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. 
Industrial Ace. Oo11~., 28 Cal.2d 756, 760 [172 P.2d 1]; Pacific 
Indemn#y Co. v. Industnal Ace. Com., 86 Cal.App.2d 726, 
729 [195 P.2d 919]), each case must be decided in the light 
of its own particular facts, and here petitioner properly 
argues that it would require ''a long stretch of the imagina-
tion'' to hold Mrs. Elliott's injury ''reasonably incident to 
[her] employment." (Torrey v. Industrial Ace. Com., 132 
Cal. A pp. 303, 306 [ 22 P .2d 525] . ) 
[2] "Where the contract of employment contemplates 
rendition of services on the employer's premises, injuries suf-
fered elsewhere are ordinarily noncompensable. Under such 
circumstances, off-the-premises activities of an employee are 
not incidental to the employment, unless some special con-
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nection can be shown. In each case, compensability depends 
upon the establishing of the existence of such a connection.'' 
(Hanna, Industrial Accident Commission Practice and Pro-
cedure, p. 37.) Application of this general rule was made 
in Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 1 Cal. 
2d 730 [37 P.2d 441], where an award for compensation was 
annulled upon evidence showing that the employee, a tele-
graph messenger on his way to work, was injured in a traffic 
collision at a time when he "was on no special errand for" 
his employer and ''he had not yet reached his place of em-
ployment where his duties were to begin." (P. 732.) After 
noting that there must be some ''causal connection'' between 
the injury and the employment to sustain a compensation 
award, the court continued at page 733: "When an em~ 
ployee is off duty the relation of employer and employee 
is suspended and does not reattach until the employee re-
sumes the master's work. It is true that this re-entry into 
service may occur under special circumstances before the 
employee reaches the premises of the 1naster, but this can 
happen only where, by contract, express or implied, the re-
lationship attaches at such earlier time. We need not pause 
to give examples of this exception.'' 
[3] Respondents argue that liability under the compen-
sation law has been extended to cover personal acts neces-
sary to the comfort, convenience and welfare of the employee, 
and within that concept the present case constitutes an ex-
ception to the general rule. But such contention overlooks 
the premise on which the exception is established-that the 
employee at the time of injury was at work and either on 
the employer's premises (Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 178 Cal. 505 [173 P. 1105, 5 A.L.R. 
1518]; F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 17 
Cal.2d 634 [111 P.2d 313] ; Elliott v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
21 Cal.2d 281 [131 P.2d 521, 144 A.L.R. 358]; Employers' 
Liability Assur. Corp. v. Indttstrial .Ace. Com., 37 Cal.App. 
2d 567 [99 P.2d 1089]) or on a business errand off the 
premises (Western Pac. R. R. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
193 Cal. 413, 420 [224 P. 754]). This principle of com-
pensability is generally stated as follows : ''Such acts as 
are necessary to the life, comfort, and convenience of the 
servant while at work, though strictly personal to himself, 
are incidental to the service rendered by such a servant, and 
an injury sustained in their performance arises out of and 
in the course of the employment. The rule is broad enough 
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to include the majority of an employee's acts upon the em-
ployer's premises, such as eating lunch, getting a drink of 
water, smoking tobacco where not forbidden by the employer, 
attending to the wants of nature, changing to or from work-
ing clothes, and many others. Such acts, although not them-
selves representing a rendition of service, are reasonably in-
cidental thereto, and are considered to be acts for the m_J!tual 
benefit and convenience of the employer and employee." ·~ 
(Hanna, Industrial Accident Commission Practice and Pro-
cedure, p. 36; see Whiting-Mead Commercial Go. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., supra,, 178 Cal. 505, 507 [173 P. 1105, 5 
A.L.R. 1518) .) As acts reasonably to be expected, they 
are regarded as taking place in the course of the employ-
ment. (Employers' Liability Assttr. Corp. v. IndttStrial Ace. 
Corn., supra, 37 Cal.App.2d 567, 570-573 [99 P.2d 1089]; 
Western Pipe & Steel Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 49 Cal. 
App.2d 108, 111 [121 P.2d 35] .) 
[4] But here the employee, Mrs. Elliott, was neither at 
work nor on her employer's premises when injured. Re-
spondents argue that Mrs. Hubbard's caution of Mrs. Elliott 
not to go far permits an inference that the latter's work 
for the day was not yet finished and her walk was a mere 
interruption in the performance of her household duties. 
However, such an inference cannot arise in view of Mrs. 
Elliott's express testimony to the contrary-that "after [she] 
finished [her] work,'' had ''emptied the garbage,'' she took 
her "evening walk" with her friend and sustained the in-
jury in question. Mrs. Hubbard's cautionary remark sug-
gests no more than the natu<ral response of a sick and elderly 
person, experiencing a feeling of loneliness upon being in-
formed that she is to be left without a companion for a 
short time. No claim is made that the walk was taken 
other than for Mrs. Elliott's personal purposes. 
[5] Nor is there merit to respondents' position that since 
Mrs. Hubbard sanctioned Mrs. Elliott's departure on the 
proposed walk, it thereby became an act "authorized" by 
the contract of employment. A similar argument was ad-
vanced and rejected in the case of Arabian American Oil 
Co. v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 94 Cal.App.2d 388 [210 P.2d 
732], involving a stenographer who worked and lived within 
her employer's fenced-in area surrounding an oil refinery 
in Saudi Arabia. She was injured when she and a co-
employee were riding in a vehicle owned by the employer, 
traveling outside the fenced area and en route to a beach 
j 
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for a swim. In annulling the compensation award, the court 
stated at page 392: "Petitioner contends that the injury 
did not arise out of or in the course of the employment, 
and that the injury was not proximately caused by the em-
ployment. That contention is sustained. Miss Brown [the 
employee] had finished her work for the day, had gone 
home and changed her clothing to beach apparel, had eaten 
dinner, left petitioner's premises and, at the time of the 
accident, was on a pleasure trip. While petitioner per-
mitted employees, after working hours, to use its motor 
vehicles for pleasure, it did not require them to do so. Miss 
Brown had complete freedom in deciding whether she should 
go on a pleasure trip, in selecting an escort and driver, and 
in deciding where to go. The mere fact that she was riding 
in a vehicle owned by petitioner at the time of the accident 
is not sufficient to create liability under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act.'' 
[6] Respondents finally argue that in taking her recrea-
tional walk, Mrs. Elliott was following her medical adviser's 
recommendation as to a suitable exercise, and so was con-
ditioning herself to perform better the duties of her em-
ployment. But if such theory should be adopted as suffi-
cient to establish the necessary causal connection with the 
employment, then any injury sustained by an employee in 
a recreational activity would be compensable. Precisely the 
same contention was unavailingly urged in the case of Wilson 
v. General Motors Corp., 298 N.Y. 468 [84 N.E.2d 781]. There 
the employee was injured while participating in a softball 
g·ame as a member of a team entered in a league consisting 
entirely of employees of the same employer. The games 
were played on the employees' own time in a public park 
some distance from the employer's plant. In holding that 
neither the fact that the employer gave its permission to 
employees to participate in the games, and even cooperated 
to some extent in the program, nor the fact that such recrea-
tional activity might indirectly redound to the employer's 
benefit as a health measure for the employees would authorize 
a compensation award, the court stated at pages 783-784: 
''These ball games, the record makes plain, were out-of-
hours, off-the-premises, personal diversions of the men, and 
were not only optional with the employees but were exclu-
sively for their own recreation and indulgence, without· bus-
iness advantage to the employer. The games were neither 
initiated nor sponsored by the employer1 in no way co:p,· 
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nected with its affairs, and in no manner subject to its con-
troL Even if the company had so desired, it could not have 
halted the ball playing or changed the program in any way. 
In other words, totally lacking is any basis for an inference 
that it controlled the activity or sought to compel or in-
duce any employee to participate in it. . . . Too tenuous 
and ephemeral is the possibility that such participation might 
perhaps indirectly benefit the employer by improving the 
workers' morale or health or by fostering employee good 
will.'' While recognizing its duty to construe liberally the 
coverage of the state Workmen's Compensation Act and the 
liability for injury ''arising out of and in the course of'' 
the employment, the court nevertheless concluded that on 
the record before it ''the granting of a compensation award 
would not only do violence to the letter of the statute but 
would offend against its spirit, by penalizing employers who, 
without prospect of profit or benefit, co-operate in enabling 
their employees to engage in social or athletic recreation 
on their own time and away from the company premises." 
(P. 784.) 
As the record here stands, the following facts are deter-
minative of the noncompensability of the claim in question: 
Mrs. Elliott was injured while walking on a public road 
as an act of recreational diversion of her own free choice 
and when off-duty from her work. Such circumstances do 
not reasonably permit an inference of a ''causal connection'' 
between the injury and the employment in support of a com-
pensation award. (See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Indus-
trial Ace. Com., ante, p. 512 [247 P.2d 697].) 
The award is annulled. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Schauer, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
'l'he facts here are simple. They are more favorable to 
the employee, however, than portrayed by the majority 
opinion. 
The injured employee, Mrs. Elliott, was working as house-
keeper for Mrs. Hubbard at the latter's home. Although 
she said her hours were eight a day, no definite working 
hours were fixed. She lived at the home and had her meals 
there. Mrs. Hubbard's doctor had advised her to take a 
walk every day and it had always been her custom to do 
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so. She would take her stroll either after the noonday or 
evening meal, depending upon when she could get away. 
Mrs. Hubbard was aware of this practice and may be said 
to have acquiesced in it. On the day of the accident, Mrs. 
Hubbard was ill in bed and told Mrs. Elliott to have her 
walk after the evening meal rather than earlier. Mrs. Hub-
bard also told her not to be gone long, giving rise to the 
inference that in view of her illness Mrs. Elliott was still 
working and on call. Contrary to the assertion in the ma-
jority opinion, that inference is not refuted by Mrs. Elliott's 
testimony that after she had finished her work she went for 
a walk, as that was merely a way of saying that she had 
the opportunity at that time to take the stroll rather than 
that she was no longer subject to Mrs. Hubbard's call and 
had to return soon to attend her. Mrs. Elliott emptied the 
garbage in a receptacle in the driveway by Mrs. Hubbard's 
house and walked into the street which had no sidewalks. 
When about 50 feet from the driveway and in front of ad-
joining lots which Mrs. Hubbard had "sold" but for which 
she had not received her money, she stepped aside to avoid 
a car travelling on the road. She fell, she said, in the "lots." 
From the evidence the commission was justified in de-
ducing that the injury occurred on the premises of the em-
ployer or that it occurred while Mrs. Elliott was in effect 
''on the job.'' In either case there is no question that the 
injury occurred in the course of the employment. In addi-
tion, however, the injury clearly falls within the rule, that 
injuries arising out of activities for the personal needs, com-
fort and welfare of the employer are compensable. Mrs. 
Elliott's walk was a habit and custom concurred in by her 
employer and in the instant case was expressly authorized. 
The cases clearly support an award of compensation under 
that rule. 
In Papineau v. Industrial .Ace. Com., 45 Cal.App. 181 
[187 P. 108], an injury was held compensable where it oc-
curred while the employee, a bootblack, was away from his 
employer's premises to obtain a bottle of milk to drink with 
his lunch; it was his custom, with the approval of his em-
ployer, to get the milk. The court said (p. 182) : "Upon 
these facts petitioner insists that the injury did not arise 
out of, and in the course of, the employment of Miles. Three 
reasons are assigned for this contention: First, that the 
claimant had left the premises of the petitioner on a per-
sonal errand and was not engaged in the performance of 
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any service for his employer; second, that the injury was 
not due to a risk incident to his employment, but caused 
from a peril common to all persons using the elevator; and, 
third, that the injury was caused by a joke perpetrated by 
the operator of the elevator. 
''While it is sometimes difficult to distinguish the line be-
tween an injury arising out of, and in the course of, em-
ployment and one which does not so arise, nevertheless, the 
facts here presented bring the case within the rule announced 
in the opinion in Archibald v. Ott, 77 Va. 448 [87 S.E. 791, 
L.RA. 1916D, 1013], wherein it is said: '.Such acts as are 
necessary to the life, comfort, and convenience of the servant 
while at work, though strictly personal to himself, and not 
acts of service, are incidental to the service, and injury 
sustained in the performance thereof is deemed to have arisen 
out of the employment.' In leaving the barber-shop, with 
the knowledge, consent, and approval of his employer, for 
the purpose of procuring a bottle of milk to use with his 
lunch, as was his custom, the claimant, while ministering 
unto himself, was, nevertheless, in a remote sense, in that 
one who works must eat, engaged in an act which contributed 
to his efficiency and furtherance of the work. Thus com-
pensation has been awarded for an accident suffered where 
the employee had left the performance of his work to pro-
cure drinking water. (Keenan v. Flemington Coal Co., 5 
F. 164, St. of Sess.) Other cases sustaining the rule are 
cited in the opinion in Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. 
Industrial Ace. Com., 178 Cal. 505 [173 P. 1105, 5 A.L.R. 
1518], wherein an award for an injury resulting to an em-
ployee from a burn sustained from igniting a turpentine-
soaked bandage on his hand while lighting a cigarette for 
his personal use, was upheld. The fact that the elevator 
in question was controlled by the owners of the building 
is unimportant, for the reason that the tenant had the right, 
as an appurtenance of the premises leased by him, to the 
use of the elevator for himself and employees in going to 
and from the barber shop, and hence the elevator was a part 
of the employer's premises .... 
''That the elevators were for the use of all persons hav-
ing occasion to use them as a means of access to the build-
ing could not affect claimant's right to the award. A like 
argument might be made with reference to injuries sus-
stained by persons whose employment requires them to travel 
upon lines of railway or ltpon the public streets, right to 
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recover for which is supported by ample authority.'' (Em-
phasis added.) Doubt was cast upon that case by Cali-
fornia Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. Industrial Ace. Com. 
190 Cal. 433 [213 P. 257], but there the court took an ultra-
conservative attitude which has since changed except for 
an occasional decision such as here. (See 22 Cal.L.Rev. 
581, 582.) 
In the case at bar, where the employee went no more than 
50 feet on the fronting street from the employer's drive-
way for a walk which she was directed to take by her em-
ployer, we have a stronger case than the Papineau case. 
In Western Pipe & Steel Co. v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 49 
Cal.App.2d 108 [121 P.2d 35], the employees were permitted 
to leave their work for an undesignated half hour to obtain 
dinner, while they were working overtime. Their pay cov-
ered the half hour. An employee left his work and drove 
to a place some distance from his employer's premises to 
get his dinner and was killed while crossing the street. In 
holding the death compensable the court said (p. 110) : "The 
petitioner contends that the law is well-settled that an em-
ployer is not responsible for the act of, or injury to, an em-
ployee while the latter is off the premises for the purpose 
of securing his personal meals. There are many cases hold-
ing that injuries received by an employee while on his way 
to or from meals are normally not compensable. [Citations.] 
''The basis of some of the cases which deny the employee 
compensation for injuries received while going to or from 
meals is that while the employee is on such an errand he 
is not rendering any service for his employer. Other cases 
recognize that this is merely one part of the so-called 'going 
or coming' rule-i.e., that injuries received while going to 
or coming from work normally do not arise out of, nor 
occur in the course of, the employment. There are, of course, 
many exceptions to both rules. It is not indispensable to 
recovery that at the time of the injury an employee must 
be rendering service to his employer. Acts of the employee 
for his personal comfort and convenience while at work, such 
as taking a drink of water, lighting a cigarette, warming 
himself, etc., do not interrttpt the continuity of the employ-
ment. This exception 1's not limited to acts performed on 
the employer's premises. In Western Pac. R. R. Co. v. In-
d~rstrial Ace. Com., 193 Cal. 413 [224 P. 754], a messenger 
was struck by an automobile while returning on his bicycle 
to his place of employment from his home where he had 
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gone to get his raincoat when a storm came up while he 
was outside performing service for his employer. The in-
jury was held compensable. In Leffert v. Industrial Ace. 
Com., 219 Cal. 710 [28 P.2d 911], the deceased employee, a 
salesman, was required to report each morning at the em-
ployer's plant to receive directions for the day. After get-
ting their instructions, salesmen customarily had a cup of 
coffee together at a nearby coffee shop. On the morning 
in question the salesmen, on arrival, found the plant on fire 
and were directed to report at another office to receive in-
structions. Before going to this office the employees fol-
lowed their usual custom of having a cup of cofree. The 
deceased, after finishing his coffee, announced his intention 
of returning to the burning building to retrieve his overcoat. 
While crossing the street to the building he was hit by an 
automobile. It was held that the injury was compensable, 
and an award denying recovery was annulled. (See, also, 
Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 178 
Cal. 505 [173 P.l105, 5 A.L.R. 1518].) ... The employer 
apparently realized that men could not be expected to work 
at their highest efficiency without food during this overtime 
period, and for that reason agreed that they should have half 
an hour off for the purpose of securing their dinner.'' 
In the case at bar Mrs. Elliott was hired by the month; 
her pay consisted of cash and board and room; she had no 
fixed hours of work and was authorized to go for a walk. 
Her compensation apparently covered that period. If an 
injury which occurred while getting dinner away from the 
employer's premises with his permission is compensable, then 
the same must be said for an injury received while taking 
a walk at the direction of the employer. 
In Whiting-Mead Commercial Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 
178 Cal. 505 [173 P. 1105, 5 A.L.R. 1518], the court afflrmed 
an award for an injury received while the employee was 
smoking, and cited with approval various situations such 
as getting a drink of water, or beer, refreshment and re-
sponding to the call of nature. 
In Goodrich v. Industrial Ace. Com., 22 Cal.2d 604 [140 
P.2d 405], we held an injury to be compensable which oc-
curred when the employee went home to inform his wife that 
he would be working all night. We stressed the proposition 
that an injury occurring while an employee is administering 
to his personal needs and welfare need not, to be compensable, 
occur on the employer's premises. We summarized the cases 
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on this question as follows (p. 607): "There are many acts 
of an employee for his personal convenience, comfort or wel-
fare, the doing of which do not necessarily take him out 
of the course of his employment, even though done away 
from the premises of the employer. (California Cas. Ind. 
Exch. v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 21 Oal.2d 751 [135 P.2d 158] .) 
Various instances of that character have been considered by 
the appellate courts: Drinking wine because of indisposi-
tion (Elliott v. Industrial Ace. Com., 21 Cal.2d 281 [131 
P.2d 521]; smoking (Whiting-Mead Corn. Co. v. Industrial 
Ace. Corn., 178 Cal. 505 [173 P. 1105, 5 A.L.R. 1518]); 
going to obtain a slicker to wear in the performance of his 
duty (Western Pacific R. R. Co. v. Indnstrial Ace. Corn., 
193 Cal. 413 [224 P. 754]) ; going to obtain an overcoat 
(Leffert v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 219 Cal. 710 [28 P.2d 911]); 
going into a hallway to obtain fresh air (F. W. Woolworth 
Co. v. Indtlstrial Ace. Corn ..• 17 Cal.2d 634 [111 P.2d 313]); 
going to obtain water for a fellow employee who had fainted 
(County of Los Angeles v. Industrial Ace. Corn., 89 Cal.App. 
736 [265 P. 362]) ; returning from purchasing a package of 
cigarettes for employee's own use (Western Pipe etc. Co. v. 
Industrial Ace. Corn., 49 Cal.App.2d 108 [121 P.2d 35]) ; 
domestic servant sewing a hem on her dress (Employers' etc. 
Corp. v. Indttstrial Ace. Com., 37 Cal.App.2d 567 [99 P.2d 
1089])." 
In Graf v. Montec.ito County Water Dist., 1 Cal.2d 222 
[26 P.2d 29, 34 P.2d 138], the employee was injured while 
riding on the employer's train operated for employee's recre-
ation and boarded after the work day had ceased. The 
court held injury not compensable, but Mr. Justice Shenk 
dissented, pointing out that the train was the employer's 
premises. 
The majority relies mainly on the ground that the injury 
occurred off the employer's premises. As pointed out here-
inabove, there is evidence to the contrary, but even if there 
were not, such is not the rule. The cases heretofore discussed 
show that an act done for the personal convenience and wel-
fare of the employee need not be done on the employer's 
premises to authorize compensation where the act done is 
customary and with the employer's permission. 
While the courts are required by statute (Lab. Code, § 3202) 
to liberally construe the Workmen's Compensation Act, even 
a rational, nonliberal construction would sustain the award 
in this case. 
I would, therefore, affirm the award. 
